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GOVERNMENT APPEAL FROM DEFENDANT'S
SUCCESSFUL MOTION TO DISMISS
NOT BARRED BY THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE-
UNITED STATES V. SCOTT
The guarantee against double jeopardy in criminal prosecution1 has re-
cently been the subject of an unusual number of United States Supreme
Court decisions which have refined the state of the law in this area. 2  One
such case, which has significantly redefined the scope of double jeopardy
protection, is United States v. Scott. 3  In this case, the Supreme Court nar-
rowed the protection afforded to criminal defendants by altering the criteria
used to determine when the double jeopardy clause prevents appeal by the
government. The Court held that the double jeopardy clause would not be
violated by allowing the government to appeal a defendant's successful mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment, which was granted before the issue of guilt or
innocence was submitted to the trier of fact. 4 The Court thereby overruled
United States v. Jenkins,5 a recent unanimous decision which had barred
governmental appeals when factual determinations would be required upon
remand. 6
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the Scott decision both in its appli-
cation of existing law and its formulation of new principles. A limited criti-
cism suggesting possible weaknesses in the decision will follow. Finally, the
Note will explore the changes in the law of double jeopardy and will attempt
to predict the impact that this decision will have on the trial and appeal of
criminal cases.
1. The federal Constitution's guarantee against double jeopardy is found in the fifth
amendment: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an excellent discussion of double jeopardy jurisprudence,
see Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1960). See also Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
2. Five such cases were decided during the Court's 1978 term. The decisions, all rendered
on June 14, 1978, are: United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), which is the subject of this
Note; Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (government not allowed to appeal from
defendant's successful motion for acquittal based upon insufficiency of the evidence); Green v.
Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978) (the doctrine of Burks applies to state as well as federal proceed-
ings); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) ( a determination of insufficiency of evidence,
whether at trial or on appeal, erects a double jeopardy bar to government appeal); Crist v.
Bretz, 436 U.S. 908 (1978) (the Court applied the federal rule, that jeopardy attaches when the
jury is impaneled and is sworn, to the states).
3. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
4. Id. at 98.
5. 420 U.S. 358 (1975). For a discussion of Jenkins, see Wurzburg & Gross, Double
Jeopardy: Dismissal and Government Appeal, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 337 (1978).
6. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975). For an additional discussion of
Jenkins, see Note, Double Jeopardy: The Prevention of Multiple Prosecutions, 54 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 549, 552-53 (1977).
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF SCOTT
John Scott, an undercover narcotics agent, 7 was charged in a three count
indictment 8 with violation of federal drug laws. 9 Once before trial10 and
twice during trial, Scott moved to have counts one and two dismissed on the
ground that preindictment delay had prejudiced his defense." At the close
of the evidencel2 the trial judge granted Scott's motion.1 3 The jury found
Scott not guilty on count three.' 4 The government sought to appeal the
dismissal of the first two counts, 15 but the court of appeals, relying on
United States v. Jenkins,16 dismissed the appeal because factual determina-
tions would be required upon reversal and remand. 17
7. Scott was a police officer for Muskegon County, Michigan. Petitioner's Brief for Cer-
tiorari at 5, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
8. Scott was indicted on March 5, 1975. Count I alleged that Scott distributed cocaine on
August 20, 1974; Count II accused Scott of selling codeine on August 24, 1974; Count III
charged Scott with selling heroin on January 22, 1975. Id.
9. The three counts in the indictment alleged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976),
which states: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance."
10. The trial began on December 1, 1975. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
11. He contended that the seven-month delay between the alleged criminal activity and his
indictment had prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and hence, was a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The specific prejudice Scott
complained of was that he could not recall the events which transpired on the date of the
offense alleged in count I. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8a, United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978). Scott relied on United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), which held that
substantial prejudice to the defendant must be shown if the delay in bringing the prosecution is
intentional. Id. at 324. But see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), which the Gov-
ernment, at Scott's trial, claimed was controlling. That case held that delay for the purpose of
pursuing a criminal investigation does not offend the due process clause. The Court there rec-
ognized that the delay is often designed solely to prejudice the defendant in that it allows the
prosecutor more time to gather evidence against a suspect. Id. at 804.
12. Just before submission of the evidence to the jury Scott renewed his motion to dismiss.
United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), rev'd, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
13. The opinion from the bench stated that Scott was unduly prejudiced by the delay in
bringing the charge under count I because he could not remember the events that transpired
on August 20, 1974. The trial judge cited United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), see
note 11 supra, in support of the ruling. The reasons for dismissal of count II were unclear.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
14. Id.
15. The Government sought to appeal the dismissal of counts I and II, contending that Scott
had led the trial court into error, and asserting that United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783
(1977), was the controlling case. Supp. to Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
16. 420 U.S. 358 (1975). Jenkins held that the double jeopardy clause barred appeal by the
government if further proceedings devoted to the factual issues of the offense charged would be
required upon reversal. Id. at 370.
17. United States v. Scott, 544 F.2d 903, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), rev'd, 437
U.S. 82 (1978).
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The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.18 In so doing, it overruled Jenkins 19 and held that where a defendant
seeks termination of his trial prior to submission of the issue of guilt or
innocence to the trier of fact, an appeal by the government from his success-
ful motion is not barred. 20 The opinion stressed that the violation com-
plained of by Scott did not address the question of his factual guilt or inno-
cence, but rather was based solely upon a technical legal defense.2 1
THE DECISION
The Scott Court was faced with the difficult task of balancing a defend-
ant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy against society's
valued interest that transgressors of the laws be punished. To understand
this, the Court first analyzed the historical underpinnings of the double
jeopardy prohibition to determine whether the protection of the clause
properly could be invoked on behalf of the defendant. The opinion began by
discussing the three common law pleas which antedated the express con-
stitutional ban on multiple jeopardy for the same offense. 2 2  It then traced
the developments in the law leading up to Scott.23
The Court next reviewed the policies underlying the doctrine. The pri-
mary thrust of the prohibition, it was noted, was to prevent successive pros-
18. 437 U.S. at 101. The majority opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist, who was joined
by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell. Justice Rehnquist also wrote
the opinion for a unanimous Court in United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
19. 437 U.S. at 101.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 98-99. In effect, the Court was distinguishing between the defendant's right to be
prosecuted in a timely fashion, and a substantive defense. The Court placed great weight on the
fact that the defendant was not claiming that the government had not introduced sufficient
evidence from which the jury may have inferred his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather,
the defendant's claim was that due to a purely legal, procedural defect, a conviction could not
stand. Id. The dissent discussed this point at length. Id. at 101-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 84-92.
23. 437 U.S. at 87. The three common law pleas, autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and
pardon, were based on the principle that no man be brought into jeopardy of his life more than
once for the same offense. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 335; 4 COKE REPORTS* 43(a).
James Madison is generally credited with the idea of including a double jeopardy provision in
the federal Bill of Rights, but his ideas were not accepted without change. I. BRANT, JAMES
MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800, 275 (1950). One proposal read: "No per-
son shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial
for the same offense .... " 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (first Cong. 1789). Legislative intent is dif-
ficult to discern, especially since the language was passed upon quickly in both houses of Con-
gress. See generally United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975); Green v. United States,
335 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 499-512 (1978); J.
SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 27-33
(1969); Wurzburg & Gross, Double Jeopardy: Dismissal and Government Appeal, 13 GoNz. L.
REV. 337, 338-43 (1978).
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ecutions which enhanced the possibility that an innocent defendant might be
found guilty. 24 Secondly, the Court recognized that a person should not be
subjected to the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a criminal trial more
than once for the same offense. 25  A third reason given for the existence of
the principle was that since the Government's resources normally greatly ex-
ceed those of the individual defendant, multiple prosecutions result in a de-
cidedly unfair advantage to the Government.
26
The Court, after examining the purposes of the prohibition, concluded
that the governmental appeal in Scott did not violate the rationale support-
ing the double jeopardy clause. It based this holding on the fact that it was
the defendant himself who sought termination of the proceedings, and be-
cause the grounds upon which he moved for dismissal of the charges were
unrelated to his guilt or innocence.
27
24. 437 U.S. 82 (1978). This is a most important consideration. Even one complete criminal
trial is a draining experience for most defendants. The Constitution has many similar types of
guarantees to protect innocent persons from being unjustly imprisoned, a few of which are: the
privilege against self-incrimination (fifth amendment), the guarantee of the assistance of counsel
(sixth amendment), and the due process clauses (fifth and fourteenth amendments).
25. The Court quoted the accepted rationale for the double jeopardy clause set forth in
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957):
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
437 U.S. at 95, quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). The defendant in
Green appealed after he was found guilty of second degree murder and arson. In that opinion,
the Court explicitly rejected the theory that the defendant had waived his constitutional defense
against double jeopardy by obtaining a successful reversal of his improper conviction. Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1957). To illustrate the Court's acceptance of this idea, it is
noted that nine Supreme Court cases other than Scott and Jenkins have quoted this language
from Green. They are: Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497, 504 n.13 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977); United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1975); Duncan
v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127, 130 (1972) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 479 (1971); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 199 (1959) (concurring opinion).
26. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 (1957). The government has enormous re-
sources compared to an individual defendant. While this may be unavoidable, it does increase
the possibility that an inpecunious innocent will be convicted. This advantage also allows the
prosecution to correct errors brought to light at the first trial without fear of economic failure,
while it increases the financial burden on the defendant. If counsel is supplied to an indigent
defendant by the government, the limited resources of a public defender's budget are depleted
further. See Note, Double Jeopardy-A Suggested Limit on the State's Right of Appeal in Crin-
inal Cases, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 759; Note, Twice in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals of Sen-
tences, 63 VA. L. REV. 325 (1977); Note, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Gov-
ernnent in Criminal Cases, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 525 (1976).
27. Although the Court repeatedly emphasized that it rejected the waiver theory as it had
done in Green, it still relied upon the fact that defendant Scott had moved for the dismissal.
Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960), held that by appealing a conviction a defendant
waives his double jeopardy protection from another trial for the same offense.
1979] UNITED STATES V. SCOTT
The Court also reviewed recent cases 28 construing the double jeopardy
clause. From these cases the court elicited two principles. First, that the
double jeopardy clause bars appeal by the government whenever a second
factual determination may be required as a result of the appeal. 29 There-
fore, the Court reasoned, such an appeal would be allowed when a jury's
verdict simply could be reinstated by the reviewing court,3" or when no
factual elements were resolved by the trial court. 31 The majority asserted
that the Scott case was similar to the latter instance, and consequently, the
only factual determination would be made on remand 32 if the government's
appeal was successful.
28. Only modern cases were relevant to the Court's determination because not until 1975
did the government utilize its full power to appeal. Early in our history the Supreme Court
held that the United States has no right of appeal in criminal cases absent explicit statutory
authority. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892). See also United States v. Weller, 401
U.S. 254 (1971); 401 U.S. 394 (1957); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 344-45 (1955).
The statutory grant under which the Government sought to appeal in Scott, was 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1976), which states:
In a criminal case, an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecu-
tion.
In 1975, the Supreme Court interpreted this statute as removing all statutory barriers to
reprosecution, thus leaving all questions of appeal to be resolved solely under the double
jeopardy clause. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). For further discussion of
the history of appeals by the government, see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 383-87
(1974). See also Note, Statutory Implementation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, New Life for a
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L. REV. 339 (1956).
29. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). In this case the jury found the defendant
guilty, but the trial judge granted the defendant's post-verdict motion for dismissal because of
prejudicial preindictment delay. Id. at 342. The Court allowed a government appeal, reasoning
that if reversal was warranted, the appellate court could simply reinstate the jury's verdict,
obviating the need for a new trial. Id. at 345.
30. 437 U.S. at 85-86.
31. Id. at 86. Jenkins and Wilson were handed down the same day as Serfass v. United
States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). In Serfass, the Court held that a dismissal ordered before the jury
was impanelled and sworn did not raise a double jeopardy bar to appeal because jeopardy had
not yet attached. In that case, the Court intimated that if jeopardy had attached, governmental
appeal would be barred. Id. at 392. See Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals
of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TEx. L. REV. 303 (1974). See also Comment, Double Jeopardy: Its
History, Rationale and Future, 70 DICK. L. REV. 377, 390-92 (1966).
32. 437 U.S. at 98-100. Nevertheless, even though multiple factual determinations are
avoided by this rationale, multiple trials and consequent subjection to jeopardy comes about,
often at extreme personal cost to the defendant. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479
(1971). The Court asserted that the first factual determination of Scott's guilt or innocence will
be made on remand. Wilson's first, and only, factual determination was made by the jury at his
trial. Once made, it need not be retested. One flaw in this reasoning is that factual determina-
tions necessarily must be made any time a legal question is to be resolved, as the trial judge can
only determine the actual nature of the alleged prejudice from facts adduced at trial or at a
hearing on the motion. Another oversight is the fact that the defendant in both instances has
been placed twice in jeopardy and has twice suffered adjudication of his responsibility for the
crime in question.
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The second factor revolves around the identity of the movant. The Court has
developed a theory which reasons that if the defendant moves to terminate
the proceedings, he has voluntarily elected 33 to forego his right to have the
first jury decide the issue of his guilt or innocence. 34 Under this rationale,
Scott was responsible for the termination of the proceedings and as a result,
should expect to be subjected to government appeal. Further, since Scott's
motion was responsible for the termination of the trial, the Court analogized
the situation to one in which the defendant moves for a mistrial declaration
and, in such course, contemplates retrial. 35
The Court's decision further relied on a finding that the termination of the
trial pursuant to the defendant's motion was not an acquittal. 36 It has been
firmly established that a judgment of acquittal bars retrial. 37 Another set-
tled principle is that a trial judge's classification of his own action is not
controlling when the propriety of governmental appeal is determined. 38  In
33. 437 U.S. at 94-95.
34. Id. This doctrine was first articulated in Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). In
Lee, the defendant moved for dismissal of the information against him for failure to allege the
correct mental element. The motion was made after the prosecutor's opening statement. Since
the trial was before the court sitting without a jury, jeopardy had not attached because the
judge had not begun to hear evidence. Id. at 27 n.3.
The Indiana theft statute under which Lee was charged, INDIANA CODE ANN. § 35-17-5-3
(Btirns 1975) (repealed July 1, 1977), required proof that the crime was committed knowingly
and with intent to deprive the victim permanently of the property. The information failed to
allege either mental element. At no time was a motion made under FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(e) to
amend the information. 432 U.S. at 27 n.2. The trial court granted Lee's motion before a
verdict was rendered. Id. at 27. Subsequent to the dismissal Lee was charged again, and was
retried and convicted. He was found guilty on substantially the same evidence as had been
presented against him at the first trial. The court of appeals rejected Lee's double jeopardy
claim arising from the second prosecution. Lee v. United States, 539 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 432 U.S. 23 (1977). The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, analogizing the disposition
to a mistrial declaration, and reasoning that the proceedings were terminated at the defendant's
request and with his consent. 432 U.S. at 33.
35. 437 U.S. at 93. A motion for mistrial by the defendant removes any obstacle to repros-
ecution which results from the success of the motion and, in fact, contemplates retrial. Other
cases which have so held are: Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1977); and United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971).
The Court weighed the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal," Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949), against society's interest in having one
complete opportunity to convict alleged criminals. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509
(1978).
36. 437 U.S. at 99.
37. As early as 1891 the Supreme Court held that an acquittal of the defendant bars appeal
by the government. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891). Other cases have so held: Fong
Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). This was reaffirmed recently in Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). In the federal system, acquittals are entered pursuant to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 29. See generally Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause Bars Appellate
Review Following a Judgment of Acquittal Entered Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), 46 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1055 (1978).
38. The relevance of this consideration is that a disposition termed "an acquittal" by the trial
court still may be deemed to be "a dismissal." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7
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deciding that Scott's dismissal was not an acquittal, the Court relied on
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. 39 In that case, the Court disal-
lowed a prosecution appeal from the trial judge's determination that the evi-
dence was insufficient to convict the defendant, holding that the determina-
tion, whether correct or not, resolved some or all of the factual elements of
the offense charged.4 0 The Court distinguished Scott's case because his mo-
tion was based solely upon an asserted violation of his legal right to be pros-
ecuted in a timely fashion, a claim unrelated to the factual elements of the
crime. 4 1 In effect, the majority stated that an acquittal must be a resolution
of at least some of the factual elements for the double jeopardy clause to bar
reprosecution 42
Having decided that the granting of Scott's motion was not an acquittal,
which would bar further jeopardy,4 3 the Court felt compelled to overrule
United States v. Jenkins.44  In Jenkins, the trial court 4 5 dismissed draft
evasion charges at the close of the evidence.4 6  The defendant's motion was
sustained because the local draft board had failed to give him a preinduction
hearing on his conscientious objector claims. 47  The Supreme Court held
that appeal by the prosecution was barred by the double jeopardy clause,
because further proceedings devoted to resolution of factual matters would
(1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.), citing United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 290 (1970). See also
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) and United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975).
39. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
40. Id. at 571.
41. 437 U.S. at 94 (1978).
42. Id. at 97. This decision restricts the definition of acquittals by holding that they must
involve factual determinations. In effect, the Court held that there must be one factual deter-
mination for every criminal trial-no more, no less. The dissent argued this view is overly restric-
tive. See notes 78-84 and accompanying text infra.
43. The three factors relied on by the Court were, first, the granting of the motion did not
amount to an acquittal; second, that retrial would not lead to multiple factual determinations;
and finally, that the defendant had prompted the termination of the trial.
44. 437 U.S. at 86-87. The Court quoted from the dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932), where the Justice said that it
is often better to overrule a prior case than to follow it when experience has shown that case to
have been wrongly decided.
45. Jenkins was tried without a jury. The Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy
clause was fully applicable to bench trials. 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975).
46. Jenkins was indicted for failure to submit to induction into the armed services. United
States v. Jenkins, 349 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
47. In Jenkins the trial court held that United States v. Geary, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966),
required a preinduction hearing to resolve an inductee's conscientious objector claims. The
government sought to appeal this ruling. It claimed that no preinduction consideration of con-
scientious objector claims, which were filed by registrants after receiving their induction orders,
was required by Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971). Ehlert, the government asserted,
had rejected Geary and was the controlling case. The court of appeals dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and held that the government's appeal was barred by the double jeopardy clause.
490 F.2d 868, 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
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be required if the case were remanded.4 8  In Jenkins, the Court 49 ex-
pressed a desire to limit the applicability of the doctrine prohibiting multiple
factual determinations 50 to cases where the verdict could be reinstated upon
reversal without the necessity of additional trial court proceedings. 51 The
decision also stressed that the proceedings, unlike a mistrial declaration, had
ended favorably to Jenkins. 52 The Scott Court, in overruling Jenkins,
stated that it had "pressed too far" 5 3 in its earlier decision by including
within double jeopardy protection cases such as Scott in which a defendant
attempts to avoid factual determination of his guilt or innocence by moving
for a dismissal on purely legal grounds. 54 It held that in this instance an
appeal by the government would not violate the double jeopardy clause.
Basically, the Court considered the defendant's "valued right" 5 5 to be tried
before the first jury and concluded Scott was not deprived of that right,
because he, by his own motion, precluded that possibility. 56  Further, the
Court emphasized the fact that Scott's motion did not address the question
of whether he committed the crimes charged, but rather, only protested the
government's authorization to prosecute him. 57  Finally, the Court con-
48. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
49. Justice Rehnquist, who also delivered the opinion in Scott, wrote for a unanimous Court
in Jenkins. Justices Douglas and Brennan filed a separate concurring opinion in Jenkins. It was
in a concurring opinion in Lee that Justice Rehnquist first expressed his growing dissatisfaction
with the scope of the Jenkins decision. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 36 (1977).
50. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
51. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 368 (1975). The Court stated that Wilson should
control only when no further proceedings reviewing factual determinations would be required.
Id.
52. Basically, there are two different mistrial situations. The first is a mistrial declared by
the trial court on its own motion. The second, the one at issue here, is where a mistrial is
granted upon the defendant's motion. According to Lee and Scott, the latter erects no double
jeopardy bar to reprosecution. 437 U.S. at 93-94. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977);
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1975) (opinion of Harlan, J.). See Note, Mistrials and
Double Jeopardy, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 169, 184-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mistrials and
Double Jeopardy].
53. 437 U.S. at 100-01. The Jenkins Court did not decide whether the trial judge had made
an erroneous ruling of law, United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975), or whether any
issues of fact were resolved in favor of the defendant, because its holding precluded the neces-
sity for such determinations. Id. at 367.
54. 437 U.S. at 86. The Court felt that Jenkins placed too great an emphasis on the defend-
ant's right to have his guilt decided by the first jury impanelled to try him, particularly when
that reasoning was applied to cases such as Scott. Id. at 87.
55. Id. at 100-01. That "valued right" was recognized explicitly in Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963). Downum was the first case in which the Court reversed a
subsequent conviction because of an improper declaration of mistrial. The Scott Court balanced
the defendant's "first jury right" against the public's interest in meting out justice to offenders.
437 U.S. at 92. See also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), which held that retrial was not
barred if a military court-martial was discharged due to a tactical necessity in the field.
56. 437 U.S. at 101. Scott's motion precluded submission of his guilt or innocence to the
factfinder for its determination.
57. Id. This determination that the defense was procedural and unrelated to the factual
elements of the drug-related offense was a controlling feature of the Scott Court's decision. If
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cluded that overruling Jenkins would advance the public interest in that the
government would be assured of "one complete opportunity to convict" 58
without enhancing the possibility that innocent defendants may be con-
victed. 59
WEAKNESSES OF SCOTT
The Court made an unnecessary departure from the principle of stare de-
cisis in deciding Scott. 60  Instead of following the recent unanimous decision
in Jenkins,61 it created new precedent where none was needed. 62 As was
pointed out by Justice Brennan in his dissent,6 3 there were other compelling
reasons for the Court to follow Jenkins. He noted that adherence to Jenkins
would have been consistent with the double jeopardy rationale against mul-
tiple prosecutions."4 Such a holding would have strengthened this constitu-
tional policy, 65 and it also would have retained clarity and certainty in this
area of the law. 66
Aside from its unwise deviation from sound precedent, the Scott opinion
contains several logical defects as well. Much of the Court's reasoning is
Scott's motion had been based upon an alibi, lack of mental element, lack of material element,
or upon an absence of concurrence of the mental and material elements, presumably the trial
court's determination would have been final and the Scott decision would have been controlled
by Finch v. United States, 434 U.S. 927 (1977). See note 60 infra.
58. 437 U.S. at 100. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 508 (1978).
59. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See also authorities cited in note 20 supra.
The Scott Court here balanced the defendant's need for finality against society's need for com-
plete justice.
60. 437 U.S. at 112-16. The majority claimed that intervening decisions necessitated over-
ruling Jenkins as wrongly decided. Id. at 101. The Court could have distinguished Jenkins on
the facts presented, or it could have found the decision inapplicable as it had done in Lee. See
note 34 and accompanying text supra. Jenkins has been cited with approval in various Supreme
Court decisions, including Finch v. United States, 434 U.S. 927 (1977) (dismissal based upon
the Government's failure to state an offense may not be appealed because factual determinations
would be required upon reversal and remand) and United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam) (post-verdict dismissal did not erect a double jeopardy bar because no further
factual proceedings would be required upon remand).
61. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
62. If the Court's waiver-legal defense rationale was truly significant, the Court could have
distinguished Jenkins and based its decision purely on that rationale.
63. Justice Brennan was joined in dissent by Justices White, Marshall and Stevens. 437 U.S.
at 101.
64. Id. at 103. The dissent argued that all of the untoward consequences of facing a second
trial would confront Scott. Id. at 106. See note 25 supra, for the Green Court's rendition of
these consequences.
65. Id. at 102. The majority conceded that the double jeopardy clause was designed to
protect against multiple prosecutions. Id. at 92. In Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (18 Wall.)
(1873), the Court held the clause was designed "as much to prevent the criminal from being
twice prosecuted for the same offense as from being twice punished for it." id. at 168 (emphasis
added).
66. Jenkins set forth a clear standard. It held that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial
whenever there appears a possibility that the trial court judge, in terminating the proceedings,
relied on facts adduced at trial. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
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based on an analogy between Scott's motion to dismiss the indictment and a
request for a mistrial. This comparison is flawed for two reasons. First, a
motion for mistrial normally contemplates reprosecution. 6 7  In Scott,
though, the defendant and the trial court believed the dismissal would be
final, because further proceedings devoted to factual resolutions would have
been required on remand.6 8  Second, as was emphasized in Jenkihs and in
the Scott dissent, a mistrial does not end the proceedings favorably to the
accused, as did this dismissal. 6 9 It should be clear, therefore, that at least
from the subjective points of view of the trial court and the defendant, none
of the qualities of a mistrial were intended to attach to the granting of the
dismissal order. 70
The majority simply held that Scott's motion was akin to a mistrial re-
quest, without discussing whether the defendant, in his motion, had evinced
any knowing or voluntary waiver of his double jeopardy protection. In Green
v. United States,71 the Court held that a waiver of double jeopardy protec-
tion must be both knowing and voluntary. 72 The Scott opinion, however,
did not look into the applicability of this test when it held that Scott had
elected to forego his double jeopardy protection by moving for dismissal. 73
The opinion never distinguished "election" from "waiver." Indeed, such a
67. 437 U.S. at 93. See note 35 and related text supra.
68. Jenkins was then the controlling law which clearly barred any further prosecution of the
defendant upon the granting of the motion to dismiss, because factual resolutions would have to
be made if the court's decision were reversed. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
69. See 437 U.S. at 114. Traditionally, under the canon of strict construction of the Criminal
Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3731, Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96-98 (1967), the Court has
distinguished between proceedings ending favorably to the accused and terminations which
allow appeal by the Government. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1977); United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 n.7 (1975); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 2167, 293-300
(1970).
70. Even though the nomenclature used by the judge is not controlling, United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 n.7 (1971) (plurality opinion), his intention and reasoning in granting
the motion should be considered. Under Jenkins and Lee, any midtrial order contemplating an
end to prosecution of the defendant would erect a double jeopardy bar to reprosecution.
Further, the defendant's knowledge of the possible consequences of his motion as well as his
motive in requesting the dismissal should be relevant factors weighed by a higher court in
determining reviewability.
71. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
72. Id. at 191. " 'Waiver' is a vague term used for a variety of purposes, good and bad, in
the law. In any normal sense, however, it connotes some voluntary, knowing relinquishment of
a right." Id. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Justice Holmes probably would
not have used a waiver theory so readily as Justice Rehnquist, especially where an express
constitutional right is involved. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dissenting
opinion).
73. See note 27 supra. In another decision, Schnekloth v. Bustamonte, the Court recog-
nized that waiver of double jeopardy rights must be knowing and intelligent. 412 U.S. 218,
237-38 (1972). Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (the requirement of a competent and
intelligent waiver when a defendant decides to forego a constitutional right was articulated in
this case, which held that the sixth amendment requires appointment of counsel to indigent
federal criminal defendants where the right has not been intelligently and competently waived).
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distinction would be quite tenuous, as both imply the same conduct. 74 Scott
clearly did not meet the first prong of the test. Since, when making his mo-
tion, he did not contemplate reprosecution, he could not be deemed to have
made a knowing waiver. 75 The second prong of the test also fails because
the Court never assessed the defendant's alternatives. 76  Nor did it take into
account the government's role in necessitating the request for a dismissal. 77
Consequently, distinguishing this case because Scott elected to forego his
double jeopardy protection is, at best, strained reasoning.
In another area, the Scott Court went far afield to allow the appeal at
issue. The majority employed an unduly restrictive definition of acquittal 78
in its effort to make the holding appear to comport with existing prece-
dent. 79 The Court reasoned that the dismissal did not amount to an acquit-
tal, which would bar any government appeal, 80 because it did not resolve
any of the fact questions pertaining to the offense charged.81 In so holding,
the Court promulgated a new test requiring that an acquittal resolve at least
74. In Green, the Court used "choose" and "waive" interchangeably. 355 U.S. 184, 192
(1957). The Scott Court freely used a synonym, "elect," for "waive" and in so.doing neglected to
afford this "election" similar constitutional safeguards. Indeed, "election" and "waiver" both
imply relinquishing one legal right in favor of another. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 608,
1751 (4th ed. 1968).
75. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
76. Scott admitted that if his motion had been granted prior to trial, he could have been
subjected to government appeal under the Court's holding in Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
377 (1975). 437 U.S. at 95. If Scott had moved for dismissal after the verdict, and if it was not
disallowed because of untimely assertion, granting it would still subject Scott to governmental
appeal under the Wilson holding. Under then existing principles of law, the only way a trial
judge could make a final disposition would be to grant the dismissal some time between the
attachment and ending of jeopardy, as happened in Scott. Defendants now will face a Hobson's
choice: a defendant in a case such as Scott can remain silent and face an enhanced possibility of
conviction because of prejudicial preindictment delay, or he can move for dismissal and face an
enhanced possibility of conviction because the Government could correct any errors in its case
which had become evident during the first proceeding.
77. Clearly Scott was the movant but the Court never fully assessed the Government's re-
sponsibility for necessitating the motion. Its preindictment delay allegedly necessitated the mo-
tion for dismissal. While United States v. Dinitz held that a defendant is protected from gov-
ernmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests, the Supreme Court never employed a
test which would take into account prosecutorial conduct indirectly responsible for termination
of trial. 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976).
78. Lee and Martin Linen would allow an acquittal to be a resolution based on facts relating
to the general issue of the case, or simply, a legal determination that the defendant cannot be
convicted of the offense charged. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564
(1977); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 358 (1975).
79. The Scott majority, while it claimed to recognize the purpose and meaning of the dou-
ble jeopardy clause, nevertheless decided the case in contravention of the literal meaning of the
words. See notes I & 25 supra. Scott will indeed be placed twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. See 437 U.S. at 105-06. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See note 37 supra.
81. The Jenkins decision had barred government appeal whenever there appeared even the
possibility that the trial court's determination might have resolved some of the facts at issue.
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369-70 (1975).
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some of the factual elements of the offense charged in favor of the defend-
ant.8 2 Formerly, an acquittal was defined as a determination based on facts
relating to the general issue of the case.83 This new definition of acquittal is
not susceptible to a principled application 84 because, as the dissent argued,
the Court offered only minimal guidance for distinguishing between a purely
legal defense and one based on a resolution of factual elements of the
charge.8 5 Justice Brennan noted, in the dissent, that many defenses involve
overlapping factual and legal components including the statute of limita-
tions,8 6 assertions of violation of the right to a speedy trial,"' and de-
fenses of entrapment 8 8 and insanity. 89 The aforementioned defenses pre-
82. 437 U.S. at 97, quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977).
83. The dissent in Scott argued that the language taken from United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977), was lifted out of the narrow context of that case. 437
U.S. at 111-12. Instead, the dissent argued, the well-accepted and proper definition of acquittal
should remain simply "a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at trial relating to the
general issue of the case.'" Id. at 102. It contended that this was the proper definition to be
elucidated from Martin rather than the narrow one announced by the majority. For support of
this contention, the dissent cited Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975), quoting
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 290 n.19 (1970). 437 U.S. at 112. See also Lee v. United
States, 432 U.S. 23, 30 (1977); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
84. 437 U.S. at 110-11.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Id. The dissent hypothesized a case in which the date of the offense is in dispute. The
resolution of the question would involve a factual determination. A legal determination may
then be required to decide whether the prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
at 115 n.10.
87. Id. at 111. Cf. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Court held that a defend-
ant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by delay of five years from date of arrest until trial.
The Court considered the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's asser-
tion of his right and prejudice to the defendant. See also L. KATZ, L. LITWIN AND R. BAM-
BERGER, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME-PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES (1972). For a discussion
of the right to a speedy trial in Illinois, see Rudstein, Speedy Trial in Illinois: The Statutory
Right, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 317 (1976).
88. 437 U.S. at 111. The dissent considered the difficulty a dismissal based on entrapment
would present for jeopardy determination. Id. at 2206. In one sense the defense is a legal
justification inasmuch as it demonstrates lack of defendant's predisposition to commit a crime.
Id. Cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (Court rejected defendant's entrapment
defense even though government supplied and subsequently purchased the illegal substance
which he was arrested for selling because he was predisposed to commit the crime). In another
sense, however, entrapment is designed to deter reprehensible police activities. Scott leaves
open the question of how to deal with such a defense. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973). See generally Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 171-76
(1976).
89. 437 U.S. at 111. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that defenses of insan-
ity and entrapment provide legal justifications for otherwise illegal acts while preindictment
delay protects the integrity of the trial process. Id. at 114. "Consideration of all three defenses
requires the application of legal standards to the evidence adduced at trial." Id. For a discussion
of the insanity defense see R. ARENS, INSANITY DEFENSE (1974). For a list of some of the
problems facing Illinois defendants claiming insanity, and proposed solutions, see Thompson,
The Future of the Insanity Defense in Illinois, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (1977).
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elude the imposition of criminal liability on defendants even though the de-
fendant in fact may have committed the offense in question. Furthermore,
even though none of these defenses are actually bound up in the statutory
definition of the crime, the Scott Court acknowledged that a trial judge may
make a final disposition of a case prior to the verdict based on motions in-
volving these defenses. 90 Accordingly, it is likely that this holding will ul-
timately lead to confusion, because legal and factual defenses are not often
clearly separable. 91
Finally, it may be asserted that the Scott rationale will be interpreted as a
general weakening of constitutional protections. Not only has a new excep-
tion to the express prohibition against double jeopardy been created, 92 but
the alleged due process violation which was the basis of Scott's motion to
dismiss 93 received only cursory treatment. In effect, the court held that a
defendant's right to assert a defense based on constitutional grounds was less
important, from a double jeopardy perspective, than the public's interest in
a proper resolution of factual issues. 94  This holding has significance far
beyond the scope of the double jeopardy clause. Indeed, it reaches all crim-
inal prosecutions in so far as it implies that legal defenses are constitutionally
less valued than factual ones. 95
90. 437 U.S. at 97-98. The question then arises whether these might be defenses which are
"favored" in the eyes of the Court.
91. Id. at 103, 111 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. The words of the clause are clear and definite, see note I supra, yet the Scott Court
found that this case did not come within the ambit of its protection. In the final analysis, should
he be retried, Scott surely will have been placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
93. The defense of preindictment delay is grounded in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1971). Consequently, Scott com-
plained of a violation of his due process rights when he moved for dismissal because of substan-
tial delay. Nevertheless, the Court held that appeal by the prosecution was permissible because
Scott asserted a violation of only a legal right. 437 U.S. at 101. For a general discussion of the
doctrine of preindictment delay, see Note, Preindictment Delay in the Eighth Circuit, 27
DRAKE L. R. REV. 110, 110-12 (1978).
94. A major question left unanswered by the Scott Court is why it did not deem preindict-
ment delay to be one of the factual elements of the offense, especially in light of the fact that
dismissals based on insanity and entrapment constitute "acquittals." 437 U.S. at 113. The dis-
sent contended that an acquittal based on preindictment delay would not be inconsistent with
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), 437 U.S. at 113 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). New York law requires a defendant to prove by a
preponderance of' the evidence the affirmative defense of emotional disturbance, to reduce the
crime to manslaughter from second degree murder. The Patterson case held that such a practice
does not violate the due process clause.
95. 437 U.S. at 98. By holding that factual defenses raise a double jeopardy bar while legal
defenses do not, the Court lessened the importance of the latter. Id. at 101. In Wilson, a
factual-legal dichotomy was first promulgated in the double jeopardy area, but not until Scott
has it held such significance for the individual defendant and the criminal justice system. Con-
sequently, fact prevails over law, statutory interpretation over justice.
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IMPACT
The effects of Scott will be both immediate and substantial. 96 The hold-
ing will be felt in both state and federal courts. 97 Particularly, it will affect
the time when defenses are asserted. 98 If a motion to dismiss is granted
prior to trial, no jeopardy has attached. 99 If such a motion is sustained after
the verdict, Wilson controls. 10 0 But if the defendant succeeds in having
charges dismissed during the trial, Scott will apply. 101 An appellate court
considering an appeal by the government must then determine if the dismis-
sal order resolved any factual elements of the charge. 10
2
The Scott case will clearly complicate the task of courts faced with the
problem of determining the proper application of the double jeopardy clause
to a government appeal. The courts must consider and balance the relative
importance of various factors. Initially, under the Scott rationale, the iden-
tity of the movant is the issue of immediate importance, because only if the
defendant makes the motion 103 is Scott relevant. Conceivably, the trial
judge sua sponte, 10 4 or even the prosecutor, 10 5 could move to terminate the
96. Although the Scott Court did not give any retroactive effect to the decision, the impact
will be marked because of the changes which will result regarding finality of trial court disposi-
tions.
97. 437 U.S. at 114. In 1969, the Supreme Court overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937), and applied the double jeopardy clause to the states via incorporation through the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). For a
pre-double jeopardy incorporation look at state criminal justice systems, see Allen, The Supreme
Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213 (1958). See
also L. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1968), and Orfield, Double
Jeopardy in Federal Criminal Cases, 3 CAL. W.L. REV. 76 (1967).
98. See note 76 supra.
99. 437 U.S. at 95. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975). See note 31 supra.
100. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
102. Id.
103. The Court's reasoning and analysis turned largely on the consideration that the defend-
ant retained primary control over the course of the trial. 437 U.S. at 93-94, citing United States
v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976). See Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, supra note 52, at 184;
Note, Double Jeopardy: Mistrial Declared without Consent of Defendant as a Bar to Repros-
ecution, 33 MD. L. REV. 211 (1973).
104. The Court announced in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (9 Wheat.) (1824), that
with respect to a judge's mistrial declaration without the consent of the defendant, the double
jeopardy clause will bar reprosecution unless there existed a manifest necessity for the action or
the ends of public justice would otherwise have been defeated. This was more recently affirmed
in Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). This somewhat flexible two-part test has been the
subject of a great deal of scrutiny, and has been met with favor by most legal writers. See
generally Mistrials and Double Jeopardy, supra note 52, at 172-83; Note, Double Jeopardy and
Reprosecution After Mistrial; Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary?, 69 N.W. U.
L. REV. 887 (1975); Note, Retrial After Mistrial: The Double Jeopardy Doctrine of Manifest
Necessity, 45 Miss. L.J. 1272 (1974); Note, Illinois v. Somnerville: An Encroachment on the
Double Jeopardy Protection, 27 S.W.L.J. 535 (1973).
105. The prosecutor's motion for dismissal is treated with regard to double jeopardy in the
same manner as if the judge had made the motion sua sponte. Downum v. United States, 372
U.S. 734 (1962). See note 104 supra.
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proceedings.106 In these later two cases, the proper application of Scott
may be in doubt. If the defendant is not the movant, he certainly has not
made an election. However, if the proceedings are terminated without a
resolution of at least some of the factual elements of the charge the Scott
holding may allow for a new trial. 10
7
Another factor to be considered by the courts is the grounds upon which
the motion is made. A motion to terminate the proceedings may be essen-
tially legal, as was Scott's, thereby not erecting a double jeopardy bar.' 08
The motion may be factually based, and if granted, will be deemed final as
an acquittal.10 9  There remains a large class of motions which do not fall
neatly into the factual or legal categories. 110 The question of a government ap-
peal from a dismissal of charges was once succinctly covered by the Jenkins
test, regardless of the nature of the motion which precipitated the dis-
missal."u Now the appellate courts will be left to a case by case determina-
tion based upon Scott.
However, in addition to consideration of whether certain factual questions
have been resolved, the courts will undoubtedly feel compelled to consider
other factors as well. In all double jeopardy determinations the public's sub-
stantial interest in meting out justice to offenders 112 must be weighed
against the vital interest of individual citizens 113 in being free from the
fatiguing experience of multiple trials.1 1 4  The confusing set of considera-
tions will be visited upon trial courts attempting to predict the consequences
of granting or denying a motion which palpably could result in termination
of the proceedings favorably to the accused. Such confusion will also con-
front those appellate courts which must decide whether it would be appro-
priate to grant a review requested by the government." 5
106. One conceivable way to narrow the Scott holding is to apply it only to cases in which
the defendant moves for termination of the trial, and his motion is grounded solely upon a
purely legal defense.
107. Perhaps the Court will allow for a new trial without regard to the manifest necessity
ends of public justice tests.
108. 437 U.S. at 101.
109. Id. at 97. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
110. See notes 86-92 and accompanying text supra.
111. Jenkins did not look to the nature of the motion, but rather, to whether facts would
have to be reajudicated. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
112. 437 U.S. at 84. This interest protects the personal and property rights of people and of
society, a major goal of the criminal laws. For a look at the state's interest in obtaining satisfac-
tion for each offense committed against it see In re Neilsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1888). See also
Bigelow, Forner Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11 RUTGERs L. REV. 487 (1857).
113. This final component, perhaps the most important, from the perspective of the United
States Supreme Court, is the Constitution's express prohibition against multiple prosecutions
and the concomitant interest of the defendant. The double jeopardy clause protects the indi-
vidual defendant from an overzealous society. The trend toward balancing the defendant's and
society's interests was noted in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Finch v. United States, 433 U.S.
676, 678 (1977).
114. See notes 24-26 supra.
115. Appellate courts will have to decide ab initio whether the disposition was final before
allowing the government's appeal.
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The Scott holding will also have a marked impact on the conduct and
strategy of the defendant's trial counsel. A defendant who wishes to have a
legal defense adjudicated but also wishes to avoid multiple prosecutions may
be deprived of the opportunity to do so. 1 1 6  Presumably, regardless of the
type of constitutional impropriety the defendant may allege, the double
jeopardy clause will pose no bar to relitigation of that issue. 1 17 A defendant,
therefore, may wish to include particular allegations regarding factual ele-
ments of the offense in the motion to dismiss if he wishes to avoid the pitfall
of Scott's legal-factual distinction."x 8
Defendants in criminal cases may suffer other detrimental effects as a
result of this decision. Although the government remains prohibited from in-
tentionally provoking a defendant into moving for dismissal, 119 the prosecu-
tion will be allowed one more chance to correct errors brought to light dur-
ing the first trial if its appeal is successful. 2 0  Consequently, it will have
diminished interest in contesting a defendant's essentially legal motion to
dismiss, for the trial court's decision will be subject to at least one more tier
of judicial review.'
Scott may also bring about an incidental increase in the instances of pros-
ecutorial abuse of suspects' rights. 122  Prosecutors are now aware that the
defense of unreasonable preindictment delay is disfavored, if only because it
has been classified as a purely legal defense.' 2 3  Even if successfully raised
at trial, dismissal motions based on this ground will be subject to further
attack on appeal, thereby giving the prosecution one more opportunity to
116. The Court found nothing amiss in the trial judge's decision to defer Scott's motion to
dismiss until after jeopardy had attached. 437 U.S. at 95.
117. This case seems to fit into the trend of Burger Court cases which attempt to limit the
more liberal recognition by the Warren Court of constitutional rights for the accused. In other
areas, the present Court has cut away at "'legal" defenses. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976), which held that federal habeas corpus is not available to test the constitutionality of
searches and seizures when a defendant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate that
claim at trial.
118. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 77 supra. The prosecutor or judge may unintentionally err, but in such a case,
if as a result the defendant moves for mistrial, the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit
retrial. 437 U.S. at 94. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
120. In Ashe v. Swenson, the Court noted with disfavor that upon a second prosecution,
government witnesses who had been forgetful at the first trial were able to identify the defend-
ant positively at his second trial. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). This case incorporated the doctrine of
collateral estoppel into the double jeopardy clause. For a further discussion of this doctrine, see
M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 499-503 (1978); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE
L.J. 262 (1965).
121. See note 124 and accompanying text infra.
122. The dissent contended that doctrines such as preindictment delay and entrapment are
designed to deter the government from engaging in objectionable law enforcement techniques,
and that this decision will not further their design. 437 U.S. at 115.
123. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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argue the reasonableness of the delay. 124 Scott will, in addition, likely result
in an increase in the number of governmental appeals allowed, since the
decision creates a new exception to the double jeopardy prohibition. 125 It is
unclear what types of motions and defenses, other than the kind asserted in
Scott, will be affected by the decision, but it seems that the holding can be
read to allow governmental appeals from any successful pre-verdict motion of
the defendant which does not relate to a factual element of the offense
charged. 126
CONCLUSION
In Scott, the Supreme Court has again altered the protection afforded
criminal defendants by the double jeopardy clause. By overruling Jenkins,
the Court moved from a clear test to a nebulous balancing approach. The
rationale of Jenkins was appealing not only for its clarity, but also because it
gave adequate deference to the objective of the double jeopardy clause to
prohibit multiple trials. 1 27  Scott defeated both of these considerations and
instead created a new exception to an express constitutional provision. The
Scott Court clearly strained precedent by using its "election" theory and the
legal-factual distinction in evaluating the constitutionality of a government
appeal.12 8  The Court apparently granted the government's request to ap-
peal a dismissal of charges because it felt that the equities of the case re-
quired such, but it did little to further the primary goal of protecting the
Constitution. In the future, Scott should be limited in application 129 and the
Court should reinstate the principles announced in Jenkins, which protected
the constitutional rights of defendants, as well as those of society, with preci-
sion and clarity. 1 30
Robert J. Ross
124. One interesting twist is that the defendant's and witnesses' memories will likely fade
even more as a result of the delay resulting from appeal and reprosecution. See note 11 and
accompanying text supra.
125. The decision will bring about an increase in governmental appeals because it created an
exception to the double jeopardy clause not previously recognized. However, the magnitude of
that increase will depend upon whether appellate courts read Scott narrowly or broadly.
126. See note 42 supra.
127. See notes 66 and 68 supra.
128. See notes 84-91 and accompanying text supra.
129. There are few defenses totally unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. This factor may
aid future courts in limiting the applicability of Scott. See note 89 supra. Further, legislative
enactment could help to eliminate the confusion that will flow from Scott. The question re-
mains, however, whether such legislation would be a return to the pre-Section 3731 days (see
note 28 supra) with concomitant often ambiguous statutory interpretation. See Comment,
Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional
Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 344 (1956).7
130. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
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